Motivated by the hypothesis that financial crashes are macroscopic examples of critical phenomena associated with a discrete scaling symmetry, we reconsider the evidence of log-periodic precursors to financial crashes and test the prediction that log-periodic oscillations in a financial index are embedded in the conditional expectation function of this index. In particular, we examine the first differences of the logarithm of the S&P 500 prior to the October 87 crash and find the log-periodic component of this time series is not statistically significant if we exclude the last year of data before the crash. We also examine the claim that two separate mechanisms are responsible for draw downs in the S&P 500 and find the evidence supporting this claim to be unconvincing.
Introduction
Several authors in the physics community (including [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , and [8] ) have written about the appearance of log-periodic oscillations in stock market indices during the months and years leading up to financial crashes. By a log-periodic oscillation, we mean that a variable exhibits a functional form such as
The cosine term in this expression produces oscillations with a period that grows or shrinks exponentially. As an example, if we let x = t c − t, where t c is the time of the well-known crash of October 19, 1987 , then we can see this pattern in the Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500) during the five years prior to the crash as shown in Fig. 1 . Such log-periodic oscillations are of interest to physicists because logperiodicity is the signature of phase transitions from a disordered to an ordered state in a spatial environment with a discrete scaling symmetry. This picture of a transition to an ordered state is certainly consistent with what happens during a stock market crash, when virtually all investors will be in agreement that the price is dropping and that they should sell, in contrast to the normal disordered state where the price remains fairly stable because there is a buyer for every seller.
It is not clear, however, that the spatial environment relevant to financial markets displays scaling symmetries. One can model investors as forming networks of friends and contacts ( [9] , [10] ). If every agent has n contacts, it is indeed possible to construct a network which exhibits a scaling symmetry, but it is not obvious that this model is a fair representation of actual financial markets. For instance, it may be a poor approximation to assume every agent has the same number of contacts and also to assume that the network is isotropic-i.e. that it looks the same from the perspective of every agent, which is necessary for it to obey the scaling symmetry.
Beyond these casual criticisms, there is the more serious question of why this network of contacts should even be relevant. Johansen et al. [9] propose a model of imitative investors which is essentially an Ising spin model, where a spin-up constituent represents a buyer, a spin-down constituent represents a seller, and neighboring spins interact in a manner that encourages them to align in the same direction. While Johansen et al. couch their model in the language of modern economics and refer to this as a rational expectations model, the behavior of their investors is entirely irrational. The behavior is not derived from an underlying set of preferences. Instead, it is governed totally by the stochastic interaction between an agent and his contacts. This is a model of interacting noise traders, not rational investors.
Although macroeconomists would be reluctant to embrace a model which characterizes all agents as irrational, it is still worthwhile to consider how the predictions of this model stand up to the data. A major deficiency of the large body of previous work is that most of the analysis has been qualitative in nature. Curve fitting alone is used to demonstrate the existence of log-periodicity prior to a crash. However, used improperly, curve fitting can be very misleading, especially in an economics context. An experimental physicist can typically rely more confidently on elementary curve-fitting techniques because he can do controlled experiments. He can identify and directly measure the relevant sources of error. For him, testing a model is just a matter of determining whether the model agrees with the data to within a degree that can be accounted for by these known sources of error. In contrast, an econometrician's task is often vastly more difficult, at least as far as testing models goes, for he must simultaneously estimate the parameters of his model and the properties of any unmodeled disturbances using the same data set (which was probably gathered under less than ideal conditions). Consequently, he must employ advanced statistical tools and time-series methods that are rarely applicable and therefore are relatively unknown to physicists.
About the only statistical analysis that has been done so far in the log-periodic literature has been to see whether crashes display log-periodic precursors in Monte Carlo simulations which model the underlying stochastic process as either a random walk or a generalized autoregressive, conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) process. However, since it is quite possible that the underlying process behind the stock market is neither a random walk nor a GARCH process, these simulations may not be particularly enlightening.
The present paper will apply statistical hypothesis testing to two falsifiable claims that arise from the Sornette-Johansen paradigm. The first is their assumption that log-periodic oscillations arise as a "rational" expectation about the price process of stocks. While most efforts to test this assumption have focused on the absolute value of prices, this assumption also has implications for the first differences of the price process, which must themselves obey a log-periodic specification. Examining the S&P 500 from 1980 to 1987, we find that the log-periodic component of the Sornette-Johansen specification is statistically significant if we include this entire period in the fit. However, if we exclude the last year, the log-periodic component is no longer statistically significant. Furthermore, the best fit predicts a crash in June of 1986, shortly after the included data set ends but well before the actual crash. Presumably the log-periodic fit is coupling to some structure in the data just prior to the crash which does not characterize the whole time series. Thus we conclude that the most naive explanation for log-periodic precursors is not borne out by the data.
The second claim that we consider was put forward by Johansen and Sornette [11] and pertains to the distribution of draw downs, where a draw down is the accumulated drop in an index from a local maximum to the next local minimum. Assuming that the fat-tailed distribution of daily returns falls off exponentially in the limit of large negative returns, they derive that the distribution of draw downs should also be exponential. Empirically, they find that the frequency distribution of draw downs over the past century does indeed look exponential except for three outliers, the 29 and 87 crashes and a crash during World War I. They infer from this that a different mechanism must be responsible for these outliers and suggest that this mechanism is also responsible for producing log-periodic oscillations. In principle, however, one can examine any set of data with one dependent variable and say that the graph looks exponential except for some outliers. In order to make this a testable claim, one has to consider whether there are statistically significant deviations from the exponential curve. In fact, statistically significant deviations do occur, and we conclude that this evidence of a special crash mechanism is unconvincing. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the basic elements of the Sornette-Johansen framework and note some theoretical inconsistencies. Since the initial papers on this subject appeared, Sornette and Johansen [12] have developed a more sophisticated specification for observed log-periodic oscillations, treating the logarithm of the price index as the dependent variable rather than the price itself. We will see in Section 3 that the logarithmic specification does fit the S&P 500 prior to the 87 crash. It also fits to the S&P 500 prior to downturns in 1974, 1997, 1998, and an otherwise unremarkable downturn of less than 1% in 1985. This raises the spectre that perhaps log-periodic behavior is not especially noteworthy and is not inherently related to crashes. In Section 4, we examine the first differences of the logarithm of the S&P 500 during the period of 1980 to 1987 and test the statistical significance of the log-periodic component of the Sornette-Johansen specification. In Section 5, we consider the distribution of draw downs over the period from 1962 to 1998 and examine whether the 87 crash deserves classification as an outlier. Finally, in Section 6, we offer some concluding remarks.
The Sornette-Johansen Paradigm
Johansen et al. [9] model the behavior of a speculative stock which pays no dividends. Agents are assumed to be identical and risk neutral, and they do not discount the future so the interest rate is zero. Given these assumptions, in a market equilibrium the stock price p(t) must follow a martingale:
for all t ′ > t, where E t denotes the expectation operator conditional on all information available at t. Strictly speaking, the E t operator in Eq. (2) refers to an expectation based on the beliefs of the agents in the model. The rational expectations hypothesis, in this context, constitutes the assumption that the beliefs of agents in fact correspond to reality, so that E t is also the objective expectation operator. In a market equilibrium where agents behave optimally according to their preferences, Eq. (2) is an endogenous no-arbitrage condition that must hold for markets to clear. If E t [p(t ′ )] > p(t), a risk-neutral agent will find it profitable to hold an infinite amount of the stock. Since agents are identical, all agents will behave in the same way, so the demand for the stock will be infinite while the supply available must be finite. Consequently, agents will bid up the price at t until Eq. (2) is satisfied. Similarly, if E t [p(t ′ )] < p(t), agents will find it profitable to sell short an infinite amount of the stock, and this also is not consistent with equilibrium.
Since the stock pays no dividends, its fundamental value (the expected present value of the stream of future dividends) is zero, so any positive price constitutes a "bubble". In a world of perfect certainty, for t ′ = t + 1, Eq. (2) would translate to the trivial difference equation
and it would follow by mathematical induction that p t must be a constant. If we assume that bubbles cannot be sustained forever, then a transversality condition (essentially the boundary condition at the end of time) will hold:
In that case, we will have p t = 0 for all t. Given the transverality condition, bubbles cannot arise under perfect certainty. With uncertainty, however, Eq.
(2) is no longer a deterministic difference equation and will have an infinite number of solutions that satisfy the generalized transverality condition
(See Chapter 5 of [13] for a review of bubble solutions.)
Consequently, Johansen et al. consider a price process which satisfies Eq. (2) but also introduces the possibility of a crash. Let j denote a random variable that equals 0 before the crash and 1 afterwards. Denote the continuous distribution function (cdf) of the crash time as Q(t) and the corresponding probability density function (pdf) as q(t) =Q(t). The hazard rate, the probability per unit time that the crash will happen in the next instant if it has not happened yet, will then be
If we assume that the crash involves a downturn of a fixed percentage κ ∈ (0, 1) of the price, then the price process can be described as dp
where ε(t) is a mean-zero noise term. The time-dependent drift µ(t) is then determined by Eq. (2):
Thus
Disregarding the noise term (whose contribution may be computed using Ito calculus), Eq. (7) has the solution ln
prior to the crash. The connection of this theory to physics lies in the determination of the hazard rate function h(t). Johansen et al. construct a "microscopic" model of imitative investors where each agent resides on a network with links to his neighbors, who may be viewed as his friends or contacts. At time t, each agent i is assumed to be in one of two states: a bullish state s it = +1 or a bearish state s it = −1. Then if we denote the set of nearest neighbors as N (i), given the states of all his neighbors at t, i's state at t + 1 will be determined by
where K > 0 is a constant and ε it is an i.i.d. noise term with E[ε it ] = 0. The sign function sgn(x) equals 1 for positive x and −1 for negative x. If i's neighbors are preponderantly bullish, i will likely be bullish also, and conversely if his neighbors are bearish. A crash occurs when virtually all agents are in the bearish state. Johansen et al. then show that the hazard rate function h(t) will be determined by K, the distribution of the ε it , and the structure of the network. In particular, if the network exhibits a discrete scaling symmetry, then the hazard rate function will have a log-periodic form like Eq. (1), and Eq. (10) then implies that the stock price will also behave log-periodically. At this point, however, we see that the Sornette-Johansen paradigm is schizophrenic. At the macroscopic level, agents are assumed to be rational, riskneutral agents who maximize a utility function. This framework is the basis for Eq. (2) . At the microscopic level, agents are assumed to be irrational. They do not choose a bundle of goods that is optimal according to their individual preferences. Instead, they imitate their neighbors with no cognizance of whether their neighbors' opinions are right or wrong. As such, the Sornette-Johansen paradigm is not a consistent economic theory.
Ilinski [14] touches on this criticism when he notes that Eq. (2) will not hold if agents are risk-averse, although the modification he suggests is not precisely correct. If agents allocate their investments at time t so as to maximize
where c(t) is consumption at time t, u(·) is the period utility function (which measures the degree of satisfaction or happiness that an agent derives from a given level of consumption), and δ is the rate at which agents discount utility from future consumption, then it can be shown that in equilibrium, the price of a stock must obey
for any t ′ > t. Note that, in addition to p(t ′ ), c(t ′ ) will also be a random variable, so Eq. (13) cannot be simplified to an expression of the form
where ν is a constant. Instead, one typically writes Eq. (13) as
where
is often called the pricing kernel. Eq. (15) can still be viewed as describing a martingale process because the pricing kernel can be interpreted as a Radon-Nikodym derivative which transforms the probability distribution ( [15] ). However, this transformed probability distribution will no longer correspond to the objective probability distribution, even under the rational expectations hypothesis. Moreover, the determination of the pricing kernel for a risk-averse agent is a non-trivial problem if agents are not identical. While Johansen et al initially claim that agents are indeed identical, their microscopic model is not consistent with this initial assumption since some agents are bullish and some agents are bearish. This distinction is also not consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis, which requires that all agents' beliefs correspond to objective reality and therefore must be shared by everyone.
This schism between the macroscopic description and the microscopic description would be quite innocuous if we were dealing with a mechanical system of unconscious constituents. Indeed, it is commonplace for physicists to construct drastically different models of the same system with the understanding that each model is only valid within a range of length scales. We do this under the presumption that these separate models correspond to different approximations of a more general model valid at every length scale.
However, we must be more cautious in applying this philosophy to systems of conscious entities. While it may seem reasonable to model people as behaving rationally at one level and irrationally at another, most economists today would agree that assumptions of rationality should be imposed at the microscopic level first if they are to be imposed at all. If individual agents do not behave rationally, there is no basis for thinking their aggregate behavior will appear rational.
In order to obtain a logically consistent theory which can be subjected to statistical tests, we need to reconcile the two incompatible sets of assumptions which underly the Sornette-Johansen paradigm. Since log-periodicity only enters their model if investors are irrational imitators at the microscopic level, it would seem that we must dispense with any assumption of rationality in the model. In the absence of rationality, we are pretty much free to assume any price mechanism, and so we will assume that the expected price (computed with respect to the objective probability distribution) mirrors the distribution of beliefs among the agents and is a log-periodic function of time.
The Logarithmic Specification
Although early investigations of log-periodic fluctuations in stock market indices prior to financial crashes focused on the specification of Eq. (1), Sornette and Johansen [12] introduced an alternative specification in which it is the logarithm of the price rather than the absolute price which fluctuates logperiodically. This logarithmic specification is preferable to Eq. (1) because it is widely assumed that investors are primarily concerned with relative changes in stock prices rather than absolute changes 1 . It is also more straightforward to compare the logarithmic specification to the once popular hypothesis that the logarithm of a stock price will follow a random walk with drift.
Let t 0 be a time prior to the crash at which the stock price has begun to fluctuate log-periodically. We define
and
Then for t 0 < t < t c ,
where E t0 is the objective expectation operator at t 0 and j(t) = 0 if no crash has occurred at or prior to t. This specification has nine free parameters: A, B, C, ω, β, t c , φ, ∆ t (> 0), and ∆ ω . Note that in the Sornette-Johansen paradigm, t c does not correspond to the time of the crash per se (which we will denote by t * ) but to a critical time where the probability of a crash becomes very large. In terms of the microscopic model in [9] ,
where η is the number of nearest neighbors of each agent. Consequently, if their model is correct, 0 < β < 1. Sornette and Johansen also suggest making this restriction so that p(t) does not become unbounded as t → t c . However since log-periodic behavior typically breaks down as t gets close to t c , it has become standard practice to disregard data points very close to the observed crash, in which case Eq. (19) will be bounded in the time span of interest even for β < 0.
The canonical example of a log-periodic precursor can be seen during the years prior to the October 1987 crash as shown in Fig. 1 , so we first consider the closing value of the S&P 500 for each day between January 1, 1980 and September 30, 1987 2 . Suppose there are n trading days in this period. Given a choice of parameters A, B, C, β, ω, t c , φ, ∆ t , and ∆ ω , we define an ndimensional residual vector e by
where t i is the time of the ith trading day. The standard practice for estimating the parameters of Eq. (19) is to use the least squares estimation procedure, choosing those values which minimize the square of the residual vector e T e. Econometricians define the coefficient of determination
where y i = ln(p(t i )) and
is the sample mean of ln(p(t i )). The coefficient of determination is often interpreted as the ratio of the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by a model to the total amount of variation in that dependent variable. The closer R 2 is to unity, the more variation in the dependent variable is explained by the model. Note however that R 2 is not invariant to linear transformations of the y i , so one should not put too much emphasis on its value. Notwithstanding, one could equally well characterize the least squares procedure as maximizing the coefficient of determination. Table 1 .
Eq. (19) is linear in the parameters A, B, and C and nonlinear in the remaining parameters. We use the downhill simplex method (see Chapter 10.4 of [16] ) to minimize e T e as a function of β, ω, φ, t c , ∆ t , and ∆ ω , using ordinary least squares (OLS) to obtain the best values of A, B, and C for each choice of the nonlinear parameters.
The square of the residual vector e T e is not a well-behaved concave (down) function, so the local minimum obtained by the downhill simplex method will depend on the initial starting point fed to the routine. Indeed, as was noted in [2] , one typically finds many local minima with fairly similar values of e T e. Nonlinear least squares (NLLS) estimation requires that as the sample size goes to infinity, n −1 e T e should converge to a function with a unique global minimum in some chosen parameter space (see [17] ). However NLLS theory does not require that e T e have a unique global minimum within the parameter space for finite samples, and the theory does not offer much guidance about how to deal with a multiplicity of local minima having similar e T e values that deviate within sampling error. The minimum with the lowest observed e T e value need not be the closest minimum to the truth.
The first and second columns of Table 1 describe two such local minima for the years prior to the 87 crash. The corresponding fits are plotted in Figs. 2 and 3. Notice that in the fit of Fig. 2 , β = .74 in accord with the microscopic model of [9] . However, the fit of Fig. 3 has β = 1.06, and the square of the residual vector is a bit smaller in this second fit.
In addition to the multiplicity issue, we face another difficulty because there is really no question that the p t are serially correlated, which complicates the estimation of standard errors even for the linear parameters A, B, and C. As a result, we do not report standard errors in Table 1 , and we will postpone a discussion of whether the individual terms in Eq. (19) are statistically significant until the next section, where we consider the first differences of the price index. Table 1 : Parameter values of fits to ln(p) for the logarithmic specification Parameters are given in the fourth column of Table 1 .
For now, we will simply observe that it is possible to obtain a "reasonable" fit of Eq. (19) to the S&P 500 between 1980 and 1987. Between 1962 and 1998, the next three most significant draw downs occurred in October 1974, October 1997, and August 1998. As we demonstrate in Figs. 4-6 , "reasonable" fits (as reasonable as the fits in [10] for example) to Eq. (19) can also be obtained during the year prior to each of these drops. This evidence might lead one to conclude that there must be a correlation between spells of log-periodic fluctuation and financial crashes.
However, this would be fallacious reasoning because we have not demonstrated that such spells do not occur (with significant frequency) during periods that do not culminate in a financial crash. In fact, when we randomly selected a draw down from the list of draw downs between 1962 and 1998 with total magnitude on the order of 1%, we picked a drop of 0.84% that occurred at the beginning of December 1985. We display the S&P 500 during the year prior to this small drop in Fig. 7 , and we see that this also can be fit to Eq. (19) .
This suggests the possibility that there is nothing particularly special about a finding of log-periodic fluctuation in the stock market. Laloux et al. [18] also relate an experience where they observed log-periodic fluctuations in a financial index, predicted a crash, and then were disappointed when none occurred. The hypothesis of a correlation may still be rescued, however, if it can be shown that fits with parameter values in a select set are harbingers of crashes.
Feigenbaum and Freund [2] used a similar approach, although their definition of a log-periodic spell was ad hoc and not motivated by any statistical theory. Between 1980 and 1994, they found three independent periods that satisfied their definition. A Monte Carlo simulation extending over 10,000 days, which modeled the stock market as a random walk, produced 17 such spells. The average time between a log-periodic spell and the next crash was substantially less in the empirical data than it was in the simulation, which suggests that there might indeed be an association between log-periodic crashes and financial crashes. It should be noted that they worked with the specification of Eq. (1), which has fewer parameters than the specification of Eq. (19) . It is possible that adding these extra parameters makes "good" fits to Eq. (19) less extraordinary.
Johansen et al. ([9] , [10] ) describe a similar experiment where they modeled the stock market as a GARCH process. They also report an association between log-periodic spells and crashes, though this conclusion is weakened by the fact that the frequency of crashes produced by their simulation was smaller than the observed frequency in the S&P 500. Thus the specification of their stochastic process may not adequately match the actual data-generating process. For that matter, since it is now fairly well accepted that the S&P 500 does not follow a random walk, it is not clear what to make of the simulation results presented by Feigenbaum and Freund either beyond the broad interpretation that this is yet more evidence that the stock market is not a random walk.
Behavior of First Differences
If we focus on a specific choice of the nonlinear parameters β, ω, φ, t c , ∆ t , and ∆ ω in the specification of Eq. (19) , then we have a specification linear in the parameters A, B, and C, and we could naively perform statistical tests on hypotheses regarding the values of these parameters. For example, it would be of great interest to determine if C, the coefficient of the term responsible for producing log-periodic oscillations in Eq. (19) is significantly different from zero.
Before we can estimate standard errors, however, we must deal with a minor obstacle. Our hypothesis is that if j(t) = 0, then
where ε(t) is a random disturbance term satisfying
There are well-known ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation formulas both for point estimates of A, B, and C, and their corresponding standard errors. These formulas apply if the ε(t) are homoskedastic and disturbances at different times are uncorrelated. However, if we consider the S&P 500 from January 1980 to September 1987, the lag-1 autocorrelation 3 for ln(p(t)) is .9994, which is not surprising since security prices were once believed to follow random walks. Stock prices may move up or down on a given day, but they rarely move far from the previous day's closing.
We can eliminate most, if not all, of this serial correlation by looking not at ln(p(t)) but at the first differences of ln(p(t)). Define
and ∆y i = ln(p(t i )) − ln(p(t i−1 )).
Then the lag-1 autocorrelation for ∆y i is only .1511 for the same period examined above. Let us also define
Then Eq. (24) implies Table 2 : Parameter values for fits of the first differences of the S&P 500 from January 1980 to September 1987 using the log-periodic specification.
We will consider the augmented specification
The additional variables δ 2i , δ 3i , and δ 4i are binary indicator variables (or socalled "dummy variables") which take on values of 0 or 1. The variable δ si will equal 1 if ∆t i equals s and 0 otherwise. The inclusion of the constant term allows for the possibility of a constant drift in the stock price index. Since the magnitude of this drift may depend on the length of time between measurements, we also include the dummy variables. (Four is the largest ∆t that appears in the data.) In Fig. 8 , we plot ∆y i as a function of time. No obvious oscillatory pattern is apparent in the graph, although this does not prove that no pattern is there.
Using the same downward simplex method used in Section 3, we obtain the parameter values listed in the first column of Table 2 . In Table 3 , we report the results of the corresponding OLS regression, holding the nonlinear parameters fixed (the linear parameters deviate slightly from Table 2 because they are computed by a different program). In addition to OLS standard errors, we report corresponding T statistics and nominal p values which correspond to the probability that |T | will be greater than or equal to its observed value under a null hypothesis that the given coefficient is zero. Note that these nominal p values are computed under the assumption of homoskedasticity and no serial correlation. It is fairly well accepted that the S&P 500 is a heteroskedastic -.002832 .001450 -1.953 .051 Table 3 : Estimation of linear parameters to log-periodic specification with full data set.
process. Since it is conceivable that serial correlation could artificially produce the effect we are looking for, we also prefer not to rule out the possibility of autocorrelation. Therefore the reported p values should not be given much credence. The search for standard error estimators which consistently estimate the standard deviation of regression coefficients, even for a model which exhibits heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of an unknown nature, is presently an active field of econometric research. We explored both the Newey-West (see Chapters 11-12 of [19] ) and the Kiefer-Vogelsang [20] approaches. However, our results were not consistent between these different methods, which suggests that our sample size is too small for the asymptotic probability theory underlying these methods to be a good approximation. Consequently, it proved necessary to use Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the finite-sample probability distribution of the T statistics. In order to perform Monte Carlo simulations, the null hypothesis must completely specify the data-generating process (DGP) to be simulated. The null hypothesis in this context, which is just the blanket assumption that there is no log-periodicity, is a compound hypothesis and does not fully specify a DGP. However, our main concern is whether any apparent log-periodicty can be accounted for by a simple specification of the index's behavior such as a random walk or a GARCH process. Therefore we used the sample mean and standard deviation of ∆y conditional upon ∆t to construct a random walk with normally distributed innovations.
In 20 simulations, six produced fits to the specification of (32) with T statistics for B larger in magnitude than the observed value of -1.312, which implies a p value of .30±.10. Thus the ∆f 1 term is not statistically significant. This is not entirely surprising since the inclusion of the f 1 term in Eq. (24) is really not well motivated in [12] . Unlike the f 2 term, the f 1 term does not come out of Sornette and Johansen's Landau expansion. Rather, it is simply included ad hoc to account for the growth trend seen in most financial indices, though this growth trend could also be accounted for by a constant drift. On -.003461 .001593 -2.172 .030 Table 4 : Estimation of linear parameters to the best log-periodic specification for the truncated data set.
the other hand, we observe only one simulation with a T statistic for the logperiodic coefficient C as large as 4.5 in magnitude. This implies a p-value of .050±.049, so we do not firmly reject the log-periodic term at the 5% level. If the Sornette-Johansen paradigm has any practical value though, we should be able to predict a crash even if we do not have all the data leading right up to the crash. What happens if we disregard the last year of stock market data? Do the first differences of the S&P 500 contain the information necessary to forecast a crash in October of 1987?
Using a window of data from January 1980 to June 1986, the best fit we obtain is reported in the second column of Table 2 , and the corresponding OLS regression is given in Table 4 . Notice that we do not forecast a crash in 1987. Rather, we forecast a crash just beyond the end of the window. Using the same DGP as before, in five of 20 simulations we obtained a T statistic larger than 3.23 for the log-periodic term, implying p = .250 ± .097. Thus the log-periodic term is not significant at the 5% level in this fit.
As we noted in Section 3, the same data set may give several fits with roughly similar values of e T e. Although the nonlinear parameters of the fit for the full data set do not give the best fit for the truncated data set, conceivably they could still produce a decent fit with a statistically significant log-periodic component. An OLS regression using the nonlinear parameters of the first column of Table 2 is reported in Table 5 . In 20 simulations, 14 had T statistics for C larger in magnitude than 2.767, so p = .700 ± .102. Thus even using the nonlinear parameters that were statistically significant for the full data set, we do not find a statistically significant log-periodic component in the truncated data set.
Since the log-periodic function is significant for the full data set, there must be some structure in the data which projects onto this function. However, the failure of this function to produce a significant coefficient in the truncated data set suggests the pertinent structure is localized within the last year before the crash. Note that this structure need not be log-periodic. We can only -.004185 .001829 -2.288 .022 Table 5 : Estimation of linear parameters for a log-periodic specification to the truncated data set using the best nonlinear parameters obtained for the full data set.
conclude that the log-periodic function represents this structure better than any of the other functions included in the regression. In fact, it is possible that E[ln(p)] is not log-periodic at all. One might wonder how this can be reconciled with the fits observed in Section 3. Serial correlation may answer this question. A short string of several increments which coincidentally fall in the same direction followed by a string of increments in the opposite direction may create an oscillation completely by happenstance with no underlying force behind it.
The Frequency Distribution of Draw-Downs
In their search for an independent form of evidence to corroborate their hypothesis that sizable financial crashes are often the culmination of forces that build up over long periods of time, Johansen and Sornette [11] examined the frequency distribution of draw downs, a draw down being the cumulative drop in a financial index from a local maximum to the succeeding local minimum. Fig. 9 displays a semilog graph of the frequency distribution of draw downs larger than 0.5% for the S&P 500 during the period 1962-1998. If we disregard the lone draw down of magnitude larger than 20%, which corresponds to the October 1987 crash, it is immediately apparent that this semilog graph looks linear. Seizing upon this observation, Sornette and Johansen concluded that there must be two populations of draw downs. The majority of draw downs have an exponential distribution, and these constitute the first population. Those draw downs, like the 87 crash, which do not obey this exponential distribution constitute the second population. Sornette and Johansen further suggest that the first population is produced by the normal behavior of a financial index obeying a GARCH process. In contrast, the second population is the result of the imitative behavior of investors, and it is this population that exhibits log-periodic oscillations prior to the draw down. While the frequency distribution of the first population of draw downs may look exponential, we can objectively test whether it is exponential. In Table 6 , we present the results of a regression of the logarithm of the frequency versus a quadratic function of the draw down size d. The alleged outlier, the October 87 crash, was not included as a data point in this regression. Nevertheless, the quadratic term in this regression is statistically significant at the 1% level even with the 87 crash excluded. The justification for separating the 87 crash out was that it did not fit to a line through the other draw downs. However, the significance of the quadratic term indicates the probability density function of the remaining draw downs is not purely exponential. Since a nonexponential pdf can certainly be found that fits to all the data, the visual evidence of two populations is unconvincing.
Of course, in Section 3, we saw that the 87 crash was not the only draw down between 1962 and 1998 with a log-periodic precursor. If we had an objective way of distinguishing draw downs with log-periodic precursors from draw downs without such precursors, then it is still possible that the distribution of draw downs without precursors is exponential.
Concluding Remarks
While the evidence of log-periodic precursors to financial crashes has spawned a minor industry in the physics community, it is apparent that a more rigorous investigation of this phenomenon must be conducted before we can come to a firm conclusion that log-periodic oscillations are indeed a signal of an impending crash. In particular, an objective definition of what is meant by a log-periodic spell must be decided upon, and a statistical association between these spells and ensuing crashes must be established.
Supposing that this is accomplished, then the theoretical challenge will be to explain this phenomenon. As we saw in Section 4, the most naive explanation that log-periodicity is embedded in the rational expectations of investors implies that log-periodicity should be evident in the conditional mean function of the first differences of a stock index's logarithm. Since we do not find such evidence in the first difference time series of the S&P 500 truncated to exclude the last year before the 1987 crash, we conclude that if log-periodicity is indeed the calling card of a phase transition, it must be conveyed through higher-order moments.
